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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION 
A. A non-party cannot take an independent, direct appeal, even 
from a final order. 
Petitioner contends that the court of appeals had jurisdiction because the appeal 
was taken from a final order. Resp. Br. at 6-11. The finality of the order appealed from, 
however, is irrelevant. Even assuming that the order denying respondent's motion to set 
aside the forfeiture was indeed final, respondent—as a non-party—could not take an 
independent, direct appeal from the order. See Society of Prof I Journalists v. Bullock, 
743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987) ("The very reason for seeking appellate review by writ 
is because the petitioner was not a party below and cannot appeal"). 
Respondent cites cases from other states which purportedly hold that a non-party 
surety may take an independent, direct appeal from a bond forfeiture order. Resp. Br. at 
8-9. A care fill review of those cases, however, reveals that each involved an appeal by a 
party, rather than a non-party. 
In People v. Wilcox, 349 P.2d 522, 523 (Cal. 1960), for example, it was the people 
who appealed from an order reinstating a previously forfeited bail bond. In State v. 
Fedder, 285 P.2d 802, 804, 806 (Idaho 1955), it was the defendant who appealed the 
forfeiture of his bail bond in conjunction with the direct appeal of his conviction. 
Likewise, in Dunn v. State, 166 P. 193, 193 (Okla. 1917), it was the defendant, together 
with the sureties on the bond, who appealed the forfeiture order. 
As in Fedder and Dunn, Utah courts have recognized that a non-party surety may 
directly appeal a forfeiture order if the appeal is brought in conjunction with a 
defendant's direct appeal of his conviction. See Heninger v. Ninth Circuit Court, 739 
P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1987) ("a bond forfeiture order is reviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment"); Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Fifth District Court, 933 P.2d 1011,1012-
13 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Bail forfeiture is not directly appealable where, as here, there 
is no appeal of the criminal convictions"). Therefore, the cases upon which respondent 
relies actually support the State's position that a non-party cannot bring a direct appeal 
unless it is brought in conjunction with an appeal by a party to the original action. 
B. A bail bond surety may obtain appellate review of a forfeiture 
order even when a defendant does not appeal his conviction. 
Respondent implies that prohibiting non-party bail sureties from taking an 
independent, direct appeal denies them the right to any appellate review of a bond 
forfeiture order in cases where a defendant does not appeal his conviction. Resp. Br. at 
2 
7-8. Respondent is mistaken, however, because if a defendant chooses not to appeal, a 
surety may nevertheless pursue an extraordinary writ in the appropriate appellate court 
and thereby obtain appellate review of a district court's forfeiture order. See Heninger, 
739 P.2d at 1109 (holding that extraordinary writ was only means by which the non-party 
surety could obtain appellate review of bond forfeiture order). 
C. Failure to establish appellate jurisdiction is not harmless error. 
Finally, respondent argues that the court of appeal's lack of jurisdiction was 
harmless error. Resp. Br. at 10-11. Respondent reasons that since it could have obtained 
appellate review by petitioning for an extraordinary writ, its failure to do so was merely 
"a procedural technicality." Id Establishing appellate jurisdiction, however, is never a 
mere "technicality." When an appellate court lacks jurisdiction it may not take any 
action on the case other than to dismiss it. See Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, <j 8, 5 
P.3d 649. 
II. SENDING NOTICE TO THE AGENT'S ADDRESS FULFILLED 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BAIL FORFEITURE STATUTE 
A. The term "address of the surety" is ambiguous because a surety 
may have more than one address. 
Section 77-20b-101 requires the clerk of the court to "mail notice of 
nonappearance . . . to the address of the surety who posted the bond." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-20b-101(l)(a) (2003). Respondent argues that this language plainly requires notice 
to be mailed to the surety's principal place of business. Resp. Br. at 11-13. Nothing in 
the statute, however, explicitly mandates such a requirement. Furthermore, the term 
"address of the surety" is ambiguous because a surety may have more than one address. 
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The Bail Bond Sureties and Agent's Act requires that "[e]very bail bond surety 
company shall have and maintain in this state a place of business." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31 A-35-602(l)(a) (2003).1 Therefore, an out-of-state surety will have at least two 
addresses, one in Utah and one outside of Utah. Moreover, fundamental agency law, as 
codified in Utah, recognizes that the acts of a bail bond agent are the acts of the surety 
whom he represents. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-35-601(2) (2003) ("The acts or 
conduct of any bail bond producer ... are considered to be the acts or conduct of the bail 
bond surety for which the bail bond producer ... is acting as agent"). Therefore, a bail 
bond agent's address is also the surety's address because the agent represents the surety. 
Consequently, the term "address of the surety" in section 77-20b-101(l) is ambiguous 
because a surety may have several addresses. 
Section 77-20b-101(3) does not clarify the ambiguity. That section states that "[i]f 
notice of nonappearance is not mailed to a surety ... the surety is relieved of further 
obligation under the bond if the surety's current name and address are on the bail bond in 
the court's file." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20b-101(3) (2003). In this case, the bail bond 
listed both a local address for respondent's agent and a South Dakota address for 
respondent. R. 11-12. As discussed above, an agent's address is effectively the address 
of the surety; therefore, both addresses on the bond are respondent's address for the 
purposes of the statute. Section 77-20b-101(3) does not specify which of those addresses 
A copy of the relevant portions of the Bail Bond Sureties and Agents Act, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 31A-35-101 to 704, is attached in addendum A. 
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is the proper address for sending notice. Consequently, it does not resolve the ambiguity 
in the statute. 
To resolve statutory ambiguities this Court utilizes "traditional methods of 
statutory construction," including the principle that "any proposed interpretation of a 
statute must be compatible with its purpose and objective." Wills v. Heber Valley 
Historic R.R. Autfr, 2003 UT 45, f 5, 79 P.3d 934 (citing O'Kefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 
956 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1998)). Presumably, the purpose of the notice requirement in 
the bail forfeiture statute is to notify a surety that their bond may become subject to 
forfeiture. Respondent implies that this purpose is best achieved when notice is sent to a 
surety's principal place of business. Resp. Br. at 17-19. Utah law, however, establishes 
otherwise. 
Utah law creates a presumption favoring the use of a surety's local address when 
serving notice of a defendant's nonappearance. As noted above, section 31A-35-
601(l)(a) requires an out-of-state surety to maintain an in-state place of business. 
Analyzing the analogous corporate agent requirement of section 16-10a-504, this Court 
held that such requirements "exist[] to benefit those desiring to conduct official business 
with the corporation by providing a readily discoverable corporate whereabouts." Wills, 
2003 UT 45, % 10. If the requirement that out-of-state corporations and bail bond sureties 
maintain a local address is meant to benefit those who deal with the corporation, rather 
than the corporation itself, then use of a surety's local address would presumably be 
sufficient, if not preferable. 
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This presumption is further strengthened by the principle that statutory service 
requirements exist to benefit those serving, rather than receiving notice. In Wills, this 
Court observed that ''efficiency of the receiving body is not the foremost goal of any 
service requirement." 2003 UT 45, f 5. Consequently, the service requirement in the 
bail forfeiture statute should be read to allow for service on a surety's local address, even 
though use of that address may be less efficient for the surety. 
B. The legislature did not intend to supplant the common law of 
agency. 
Respondent argues that the legislature's intent to supplant the common law of 
agency is evident from the statute. Resp. Br. at 15-17. The provisions to which 
respondent cites, however, do not demonstrate such an intent. 
The fact that the legislature provided separate definitions for "bail bond agent" and 
"bail bond surety" in section 31A-35-102 does not indicate an intent to supplant the 
common law. The section merely defines the various persons who participate in the bail 
bond process. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-35-102 (2003). Nothing in that section 
limits the scope of a bail bond agent's authority. See id. Rather, the Act actually codifies 
fundamental agency law principles by recognizing that "the acts or conduct of any bail 
bond producer ... who acts within the scope of the authority delegated to him by the bail 
bond surety, are considered to be the acts or conduct of the bail bond surety for which the 
bail bond producer ... is acting as agent." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-35-601. Moreover, 
even though in 2003 the legislature substituted the term "bail bond producer" for "bail 
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bond agent/1 section 31A-35-601 establishes that the "producer" nevertheless acts "as 
agent" for a surety. See id. and amendment notes. 
Nor does section 31 A-35-704(2) indicate the legislature's intent to supplant 
common agency law. That section requires bail bond agents and sureties to "irrevocably 
appoint[] the clerk of the court as agent upon whom any papers affecting the bail bond 
surety's or bail bond producer's liability on the undertaking may be served." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31 A-35-704(2) (2003). Respondent claims this section "makes the entire 
statute confusing and arguably inoperable" because, if the court clerk is the agent for 
service of any papers regarding the surety's liability, then a surety would be deemed to 
have notice of a defendant's nonappearance "immediately upon the court entering a 
defendant's failure to appear on the docket." Resp. Br. at 16. 
Any confusion created by section 31 A-35-704(2) resolves, however, when it is 
read in conjunction with section 77-20b-101(l) which requires the court clerk to send 
notice of the nonappearance to the surety. While the court clerk is the surety's agent for 
service under section 31 A-35-704, the court clerk is statutorily required to forward notice 
to the surety. 
As respondent recognizes, common agency law would impute the court clerk's 
knowledge to the surety because the clerk is the surety's statutorily designated agent. 
Resp. Br. at 16. Nevertheless, the legislature explicitly supplanted fundamental agency 
law with respect to the scope of the court clerk's agency, by requiring the clerk to 
forward notice to the surety. The bail forfeiture statute does not contain a similar 
requirement for bail bond agents. If the legislature intended to supplant fundamental 
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agency law with respect to bail bond agents, it certainly could have done so, just as it did 
with court clerks. That the legislature did not, supports the State's reading of the statute. 
Finally, the deletion of subsection (b) from section 77-20b-101(3) does not 
indicate the legislature's intent to alter common agency law. Subsection (b) provided that 
notwithstanding a failure to follow the statutory requirements for notifying a surety of a 
defendant's nonappearance, a surety would not be relieved of its obligation under the 
bond if it otherwise had "actual notice of the defendant's failure to appear." See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-20b-101 amendment notes. Deletion of this subsection does indicate 
the legislature's intent to relieve a surety of its obligation under the bond, regardless of its 
actual knowledge, if the statutory requirements for notifying the surety are not satisfied. 
The deletion sheds no light, however, on whether those notice requirements can be 
fulfilled by sending notice to a surety's agent, who's knowledge is imputed to the surety 
under common agency law principles. Consequently, the statutory provisions that 
respondent cites do not indicate the legislature's intent to supplant common agency law. 
C. The agent's issuance of a bond in an amount greater than 
authorized does not affect that validity of the notification. 
Respondent argues that its agent's knowledge cannot be imputed to it because the 
agent acted outside the scope of his authority by issuing a bond for a greater amount than 
authorized. Resp. Br. at 14. The agent's actions, however, were within the scope of his 
authority. 
The fact that respondent's agent, Candland, may have committed fraud does not 
necessarily mean that he acted outside his authority. "An agent does not cease to act 
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within the course of his employment merely because he engages in fraud upon a third 
person; it is of no consequence that he is deceiving the principal along with the third 
person." Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, f 26, 61 P.3d 1009 
(citing 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit, § 311 (1985)). By issuing a bail bond, Candland 
was carrying out the objectives of his agency. The use of improper methods to achieve 
those objectives did not place him outside the scope of his authority. See id, at f 27. 
Consequently, his knowledge should be imputed to respondent. See id. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should either vacate or reverse the court of appeals' opinion. 
Respectfully submitted this j>Q day of December 2003. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH CODE ANN. 
31A-35-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Bail bond" means a bond for a specified monetary amount that is: 
(a) executed by a bail bond producer licensed in accordance with Section 31A-35-
401;and 
(b) issued to a court, magistrate, or authorized officer as security for the subsequent 
court appearance of the defendant upon the defendant's release from actual custody 
pending the appearance. 
(2) "Bail bond producer" means an individual who: 
(a) is appointed by: 
(i) a surety insurer that issues bail bonds; or 
(ii) a bail bond surety company licensed under this chapter; 
(b) is appointed to execute or countersign undertakings of bail in connection with 
judicial proceedings; and 
(c) receives or is promised money or other things of value for engaging in an act 
described in Subsection (2)(b). 
(3) "Bail bond surety" means a person that: 
(a) (i) is a bail bond surety company licensed under this chapter; or 
(ii) a surety insurer; and 
(b) issues bonds to secure: 
(i) the release of a person from incarceration; and 
(ii) the appearance of that person at court hearings. 
(4) "Bail bond surety company" means any sole proprietor or entity who: 
(a) (i) is the agent of a surety insurer that issues a bail bond in connection with 
judicial proceedings; 
(ii) pledges the assets of a letter of credit from a Utah depository institution for a 
bail bond in connection with judicial proceedings; or 
(iii) pledges personal or real property, or both, as security for a bail bond in 
connection with judicial proceedings; and 
(b) receives or is promised money or other things of value for a service described in 
Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) "Bail enforcement agent" means an individual who: 
(a) is employed or contracted with to: 
(i) enforce the terms and conditions of a defendant's release on bail in a civil or 
criminal proceeding; 
(ii) apprehend a defendant or surrender a defendant to custody; or 
(iii) both Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); and 
(b) receives or is promised monies or other things of value for the services described 
in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) "Board" means the Bail Bond Surety Oversight Board created in Section 31 A-35-201. 
(7) "Certificate" means a certificate of authority issued under this chapter to allow an 
insurer to operate as a surety insurer. 
(8) "Indemnitor" means an entity or natural person who enters into an agreement with a 
bail bond surety to hold the bail bond surety harmless from loss incurred as a result of 
executing a bail bond. 
(9) "Liquid assets" means financial holdings that can be converted into cash in a timely 
manner without the loss of principal. 
(10) "Principal" means an individual or coirporation whose performance is guaranteed by 
bond. 
(11) "Surety insurer" means an insurer that: 
(a) is licensed under Chapter 4, 5, or 14; 
(b) receives a certificate under this title; and 
(c) issues bail bonds. 
(12) "Utah depository institution" is a depository institution, as defined in Section 7-1-
103, that: 
(a) has Utah as its home state; or 
(b) operates a branch in Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-35-102, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 293, § 12; 2000, ch. 259, § 2; 
2003, ch. 298, § 106. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added the definitions 
of "bail bond surety company," "liquid assets," "surety insurer," and "Utah depository 
institution"; deleted definitions of "Department," "insurance bail bond surety company," 
"letter of credit bail bond surety company/' and "property bail bond surety company"; in 
Subsection (l)(a) substituted "bail bond agent licensed in accordance with Section 31A-
35-401" for "qualified certificate holder under this chapter"; and made related and 
stylistic changes. 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, substituted "producer" for "agent" in 
Subsections (1) and (2). 
31A-35-601. Acts of agent 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Bail recovery agent" means an individual employed by a bail enforcement agent 
to assist the bail enforcement agent regarding civil or criminal defendants released on 
bail by: 
(i) presenting a defendant for required court appearances; 
(ii) apprehending or surrendering a defendant to a court; or 
(iii) keeping the defendant under necessary surveillance. 
(b) "Bail recovery apprentice" means an individual who: 
(i) is employed by a bail enforcement agent; and 
(ii) works under the direct supervision of that bail enforcement agent or under the 
direct supervision of a bail recovery agent employed also by the bail enforcement 
agent, unless the bail recovery apprentice is conducting activities at the direction 
of the employing bail enforcement agent that do not require direct supervision. 
(2) The acts or conduct of any bail bond producer or bail enforcement agent, bail 
recovery agent, or bail recovery apprentice who acts within the scope of the authority 
delegated to him by the bail bond surety, are considered to be the acts or conduct of the 
bail bond surety for which the bail bond producer or bail bond enforcement agent, bail 
recovery agent, or bail recovery apprentice is acting as agent. 
(3) The acts or conduct of any bail bond producer or bail enforcement agent, bail 
recovery agent, or bail recovery apprentice who acts within the scope of the authority 
delegated to him by the bail bond producer are considered to be the acts or conduct of the 
bail bond producer for which the bail enforcement agent is acting as agent. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-35-601, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 293, § 28; 2003, ch. 298, § 113. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, substituted 
"producer" for "agent" throughout Subsections (2) and (3). 
31A-35-602. Place of business - Records to be kept there. 
(1) (a) Every bail bond surety company shall have and maintain in this state a place of 
business: 
(i) accessible to the public; and 
(ii) where the bail bond surety company principally conducts transactions 
authorized by its bail bond surety company license. 
(b) The address of the place of business described in Subsection (l)(a) shall appear 
upon: 
(i) the application for a bail bond surety company license; and 
(ii) the bail bond surety company license issued under this chapter. 
(c) A bail bond surety company shall notify the commissioner of any change in the 
address required by this Subsection (1) within 20 days after the change. 
(d) This section does not prohibit a bail bond surety company from maintaining the 
place of business required under this section in the licensee's residence, if the 
residence is in Utah. 
(2) The bail bond surety company shall keep at the place of business described in 
Subsection (l)(a) the records required under Section 31A-35-604. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-35-602, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 293, § 29; 2000, ch. 259, § 14. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted references 
to licenses for references to certificates, and made related and stylistic changes. 
31A-35-704. Submission of bail bond sureties and producers to jurisdiction of court. 
By applying for and receiving a license or certificate to engage in the bail bond surety 
insurance business in accordance with this chapter, a bail bond surety or bail bond 
producer: 
(1) submits to the jurisdiction of the court; 
(2) irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as agent upon whom any papers 
affecting the bail bond surety's or bail bond producer's liability on the undertaking 
may be served; and 
(3) acknowledges that liability may be enforced on motion and upon notice as the 
court may require, without the necessity of an independent action. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-35-704, enacted by L. 1998, ch. 293, § 39; 2000, ch. 259, § 22; 
2003, ch. 298, § 122. 
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "a license 
or certificate to engage in the bail bond surety insurance business" for "certification" in 
the introductory paragraph, and made related and stylistic changes. 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, substituted "producer" for "agent" and 
"producer's" for "agent's." 
